On the Resurrection of the Dead by James T. Turner Jr

Author:James T. Turner, Jr.
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis (CAM)
Published: 2018-07-28T16:00:00+00:00

I think Baker will agree with (6*). How, though, does Jones come to have this accidental property? Baker’s constitution view seems to imply that Jones qua human person comes to have this property by sharing it with Body in the constitution relation. But this implies that, in (6) and (6*), constitution is presupposed. The “is” of predication seems like it implies an “is” of constitution. For, another way to understand the consequent of (6*), written with the “is” of predication in mind, is: “then Jones, by way of the constitution relation, has the accidental property of being made of organic flesh.” And, if this is correct, then, as with an explicit “is” of constitution, one of the definientia presupposes the definiendum. As a result, (C*), Baker’s definition of constitution, loses its explanatory power, in so far as it is a physicalist thesis. So, the instances of “is” in (6) cannot be the “is” of predication. Since they are not the “is” of predication nor the “is” of constitution (for the same reasons), then the only “is” that is left is the “is” of identity. I explained above how the “is” of identity fails to make any sense of (6).

Perhaps, though, we can further amend (6) so that the “is” of identity makes sense (i.e., so that it does not imply that x and y are identical to “stuff” simpliciter). A plausible reformulation might be this:

(6**): If Body is identical to a particular unit of organized matter, then Jones is identical to the same particular unit of organized matter.

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